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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE B. RING, 
Plaintiff a1ul Appellant) 
vs. 1 Case No. 12961 
\V ALLACE H. RING, \ 
Defendarnt aJnd Respondent) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a post-divorce proceeding whereilJl the de-
fendant (husband) petitioned the Court to eliminate his 
obligation to pay alimony and to provide for specific 
times and places for visita1tion rights with h~s children. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Jffoceedings below resulted in the entry of certain 
Orders affecting the Divorce Decree. On .May 22, 1972~ 
tlw Court ordered: 
1. That the Divorce Decree be modified to provide 
that in addition to reasonable rights of visitation that 
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defendant should have the three children of the parties 
with him for a period of one month during summer school 
vacation which could be extended to two months on re-
quest of the children, and that the children spemd one 
week of the Christmas vacation with their father includ-
ing Christmas Day every other year. 
2. That the provision for alimony in the Divorce 
Decree be modified to reduce the same from $600.00 per 
month to $1.00 per year. 
3. That child support be increased to $125.00 per 
month per child. (Although the child support issue was 
not raised in the Court below, the increase, in child sup-
port was suggested by the Trial Court and voluntarily 
accepted by the defendant). 
On the 4th day of August, 1972, the Lower Court 
further modified the Divorce Decree by providing that 
the provision relaitive to Federal and State income tax 
exemptions should be eliminated from the Decree. 
RELI:IDF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the Order relati1ng to visitation 
and alimony be reversed. Respondent has cross appealed 
seeking reversal of the Order relating to the elimination 
of the Provision of the Decree relatirng to the Federal and 
State tax exemptions. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Resporndent does not fully accept the Statement of 
Facts set forth by appellant and there.fore deems it 
necessary to further refeir to the Record in support of the 
Order of the Lower Court. 
'rhe parties were divorced by a Decree of the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, entered September 19, 
1968 (R. 24). It became final January 4, 1969. The De-
cree provided among other things that custody of the 
three children of the parties was awarded to the plain-
tiff (appellarnt) subject to defendants (respondent) rea-
sonable visitation rights. 'Dhe children of the parties are: 
Rebecca, age 15; Eric, age 12; and Mark, age 9%. 
Appellant was awarded the family home at 2996 
Sequoia Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and in addition was 
awarded $600.00 per month alimony and $300.00 pe1r 
month child support which reduced to $200.00 per month 
in February of 1969. 
There have been significant changes in the situa-
tion of appellant since the entry of the Decree. These 
changes of circumstances were the motivating factors in 
the eonmwncement of these post-divorce proceedings. 
As we explore these factors iit is well to discuss certain 
facts existing at and near the time of the divorce. Both 
appellant and respondent are medical doctors -re-
spondent is a specialist in the field of pediatric anes-
tliPsiology a1nd practices almost exclusively at the Pri-
mar~· Childn·n's Hospital in Salt Lake City, Ftah. During 
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the marriage of the parties and particularly in the last 
period of time before the parties were divorced, appellant 
had not actively practiced her profession but had chosen 
rather to engage in activities other than the practice 
of medicine and she had practiced only on a part-time 
basis. Her last Income Tax Return prior to the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce was for the calendar year 1967, and 
it showed a gross income of $6,996.68 (Ex. 2). Although 
appellant had expressed a preference for the medical 
field of Public Health, nonetheless at the time of tihe 
divorce she was not specialized in that field. After the 
divorce with the assistamee of the Utah State Department 
of Health, together with a Federal stipend, appellant 
voluntarily elected to further pursue her career and 
training and is now qualified as a specialist in the field 
of Public Health. (R. 90). In 1971, appellant was of-
fered a permanent and "challenging position" with the 
United States Government in a Department of Health, 
Education and \V elfare. Her headquarters are in San 
Francisco, California, and she has chosen to permanently 
resride in the State of California and is now residing at 
El Cerr:Uto, California. 
The position now held by appellant is a high le;vel, 
administrative positioo requiring that she supervise 
several Western States including Bawa.ii. The ~alary 
she receives is commensurate with the demand of the 
position. As shown on Exhibit 1-D her annual base 
salary is $25,620.00 per year. 
This salary is entirely adequate for the support of 
4 
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appellanit. Testimony is explicit on this point .. 
Q. Now, as far as you personally are concerned, 
you are able to support yourself, adequately, 
are you not, on your salary? 
A. Yes. (R.107). 
In addition to the dramatic increase in annellant's 
earnings, there have beein additional economic changes 
since the divorce. 
The plaintiff now leases the real property sh~ re-
eei ved in the Divorce Decree and she receives net, $100.00 
per month. (R. 104). 
She received property of the approximate value of 
$30,000.00 from hf'r father's estate. (R. 103). 
At the time of the divorce appellant was undergoing 
exteinsive psychotherapy and for the tax year prior to the 
<livoree, claimed approximately $3,500.00 in medical ex-
pense for this item. (Exhibit 5-D). This substantial item 
of medical expense \Yas entirely eliminated shortly after 
the divorce. (R. 101). 
With rental income of $100.00 per month; potential 
interest of at least $100.00 per month om the inheritance 
and a reduction of medical expense of approximately 
$300.00 iier month, the appellant has had an increase in 
monthly ea11rnings of about $2,000.00 per month. 
Another incidental fact that should be mentioned is 
that when the children were residing here in Salt Lake 
Cit>', Utah, they were attendirng Rowland Hall and it was 
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expensive for appellant to maintain them in that private 
school. They are now attending public schools in the 
State of California. (R. 158). 
A factor also to be considered is that appellant is 
well ple1ased with her position with the United States 
Government - intends to stay with it and as time goes 
by, she will earn more money. (R. 94-95). 
Appellant is a woman with extensive training and 
professional competence. She contributes much to society 
and does so by choice. For this, she receives compensa-
tion at a level achieved only by a very few in our society. 
To say at this time that appellant strunds in need of 
alimony from her former husband is to distort the mean-
ing of that term beyond legal comprehension. 
By testimony and also statements i1n the Brief of 
appellant, it is clear that the primary purpose of ap-
pellant coming to the State of Utah for the purpose of 
these post-divorce proceedings was to contest respond-
ent's Petition for a well-defined right of visitation with 
his children. 
It is a fact, amply demonstrated by the testimony and 
conduct of appellant, that she does not ·want respondent 
to have any meaningful association with his children. 
Appellant, however, is far too ~ntelligent and cunning to 
sav this in so manv words, but the fact, and it is fart. . . 
is amply demonstrated by this Record. 
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ARGUMEN'l' 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN MODIFYING 
THE CUSTODY PROVISION OF THE DECREE. 
If further clarification of the attitude of appellant 
toward the children and her desire to keep them from 
all contact with the father is needed, it is clearly set forth 
in Point I of appellant's Brief. 
Here she states quite clearly that she does not want 
the children two months of the year, in a "different home, 
in a different city, under the supervision of a person 
whose attitude and concepts of right conduct are a srtrong 
variance from appellants." (Appellant's Brief, Page 4.) 
8he obviously deeply resents the fact that the father of 
these children should have anything to do with their 
can• and upbringing and reserves to herself the super-
power of being the only person capable of giving these 
children the love, guidance, and concepts of right con-
duct. It also shows her deep antipathy for the respond-
ent, else why should she in every way attempt to deprive 
him of one of the che,rished things in life, and that is the 
love and associM:io1n of the children. 
Respondent has a deep love and affection for his 
children and it is well at this point that we e:immine 
his attitude and desires ilJl this rt-gard. 
Q. . .. When did they go to California 1 
A. They moved to California in September of 
'70. 
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Q. Now, in your own words, Doctor, I want vou 
to tell 1the court the nature of the relation;hip 
you have enjoyed with your children 1 
A. Well, I thi!nk it has been a rather excellent 
one. Matter of fact, I believe it to be remark-
able. I have a very fond affection; I love the 
three of them, very much; and I feel very 
confident that they love me, very, very mucl~ . 
.A!t every opportunity that we have had to 
be together, we have enjoyed it. They have 
1been very good about writing to me, regularly, 
since they moved to California; aind I think 
that the relationship has been what I would 
call a very wholesome one. 
Q. Now, I want you to tell the court how you 
would like this visitation matter handled in 
the future, and why1 
A. I would like the opportunity to have the chil-
dren with me for a block of time - a period 
of time - I really don.'t think that it is wise 
to try to be a father to the children on sort 
of a week-end basis. 
Of course, if I had my real rathers, I vYonld 
rather have them, full-time, but I appreciate 
that that isn't the wav it can be done; but I 
would like to have an ~pportnnity to be a real 
father to them; and I don't really think this 
is possible on whe1re I just see the children 
for verv short visits amd with the' - as long-
as the~ were in the city - it was not thait 
difficu'lt because I conld, at least, have them 
at my house over a week-end, and so forth; 
take them on trips, and that kind of thing-. 
But with the separation, it is extremely diffi-
cult to maintain a real relationship with the 
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children that iH of subHtamce of father-child 
relationship. 
~ d_on't want the kind of relationship where 
it is sort of popcorn-candy-games, fun. I 
want a relationship where I am "Daddy." 
They know, do something wrong, they' get 
paddled; they know that, nnw, and I am not 
trying to say - I don't want to leave the 
impression, I am some sort of a cruel father 
' because they really do respond to me -
respect me and love me; know I am fair. 
I do1J1't see how I can have that relationship-
! think children need their father - le,t me 
put it that way; and I love my children and 
I want to fulfill that need for them; but I 
don't see how I can adequately fulfill that 
need unless I cain be what a father ought to 
be. (R. 109-110 and 111). 
At the time the parties entered into their written 
Stipulation that resulted in the Divorce Decree, respond-
ent had reason to be concerned about the future where-
abouts of his childrelJl. Appellant is not a native Utahn 
and has no real ties, familial or otherwise, for this State, 
and hence, there is a provision in the property settlement 
Stipulation entered into by the parties, which reads as 
follows: 
"5. Neither party shall take the children out 
of the jurisdiction of this court except upon the 
approval of the other part>· in writing or upon 
order of this court." (R.17). 
Although rt:his provision of the Stipulation did not get 
incorporated in the Decree of Divorce, it is, nonetheless, 
binding on tlw parties. It beam the signatnrP of each. 
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As indicated above, appellant elected to take the 
children to the State of California in the fall of 1970 
' 
while she pursued her residency in the field of public 
medicine. She did not, at that time, nor has she at any 
time since, secured the agreement of respandent or the 
permission of the Utah Court to do this. Admittedly, 
when she first went to California, she intended to return 
after her formal residency requirements were completed 
a year later. There is a question whether under these 
circumstances it would be necessary to secure approval. 
However, some time during the summer of 1971, she 
sought and received the position spoken of above with 
the United States Government and voluntarily elected 
to leave this jurisdiction permanently. 
Significruntly, appellant did not advise respondent 
of the fact that she would not return to the State of 
Utah until after the children were in school. Thereafter 
appellant made no effort whatever to afford to respond-
ent an opportunity to visit with his children OIJl, a reason-
able basis. 
The evidence then shows that approximately two 
weeks prior to the hearing on this matter in April, 1972, 
respondent had visited his children in California and 
was told by them that their plans for the summer had 
already been made. 
Q. Well, what are tht> nature of the "pressnrPs" 
that you feel might be exerted upon them? 
A. Mr. Allen, I have never, in the entire tinw I 
have known my children, had them. for any 
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reason, refuse to come to mv house or come 
to this event because of anything in the way; 
but, two weeks ago, when I visited with them 
they all told me they had plans alroodv mad~ 
for this summer. (R.119). · 
What we see operating here is the very subtle but 
persuasive "pressure" of the parent having custody 
of the children. 
During the hearimg in the Court below on the question 
of visitation by the father, appellant was equivocal 
whether she thought it reasonable that the children spend 
time in the summer. It finally appeared that appellant 
would be willing that the children spend two months 
in the summer with their father providing: 
( l) th~~ children wanted to ; and 
( 2) that they were cared for (R. 161). 
She would not give the children an absolute veto over 
whether they should visit with their father, but, none-
theless, she felt that if they had other plans, they should 
not have to visit with their father. Her masoning is 
subtly designed to win the approval of the Court. But 
Pxperienced Judges know that the parent with primary 
custody can always, and frequently does, construct plans 
and events that effectivelv exclude the other parent. Thus 
ronfronted, the Court wisely entered an Order which was 
not conditional, and provided that respondent should 
han' thP children visit with him in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for a one month period during the snnnne-r vacation which 
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could be extended to two months if the children so elected 
in writing. 
AppeUant became aware of the decision of the Court 
about the 14th day of May, 1972, but attempted to further 
frustrate the respondent in his desire to visit with his 
children by stating that she had no intentio;n of allowing 
the children to visit with their father until matters were 
finally settled and dete1rmined by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah. 
This fact was set forth to the Court in a Petition 
(R. 44) and it became necessary for the Court on June 
13, 1972, to enter a specific Order providing for re1spond-
ent's visitation rights at specific times. Fortunately the 
final attempt of appellant to frustrate the visitation 
rights of respondent was torted by the Court. 
As so frequently happens in these cases, appellant 
and respondent find it impossible to communicate and it 
becomes necessay for a Court to spell out certain rights 
and obligations. We do, however, say to appellant at this 
time, that it is not the iintention of respondent to bludgeon 
either her or the children with a visitation Order. Re-
spondent does not, however, want to be confronted each 
summer with plans already made that make it impossible 
for the children to be with him. He merely wants to be 
cOlnsulted when the plans arE> made so that he can be 
with the children for at ]east on<' month at a time when it 
is convenient to all parties. 
Appellant goes on to inf Pr in Point I of Argument 
that the parent with mere visitation rights should exer-
12 
c1se no fundamental influence on the childre111 and that 
respondent has demonstrated little desire in the past 
for companionship with his children and that the Record 
does not reveal a change in circumstances justifying the 
Court in taking the children fr,om their mother for months 
each year. 
Appellant the111 concedes that the children may re-
quire both masculine and feminine influences and that a 
father may need and deserve the companionship and 
affectio111 of his children. However, appellant says that 
these arguments should be made at the time of the divorce 
proceedings and that once the Decree has been entered it 
should be final. 
The argument of appellant overlooks both well estab-
lished law and statutory pronouncements i111 this State 
and two fundamental matters in the divorce and the 
divorce proceedings. 
The Lower Court fonnd in its Findiing of Fact 15 
( R 40) as follows : 
"The fact that the children are now residing- some 
distance from the place of residence of the de-
fendant has made it dificult for the defendant to 
exercise his rights of visitation. The defemdant 
shows that he loves his children and desires to 
give to them guidance, affection and ~iscipline, 
and that this cannot be reasonably achieved un-
less the children are with him for an extended 
period of time. It is rp,asona?le that each of ~he 
ehildren spend one month durmg the summer with 
the defendant and shall he entitled to spend hvo 
months with their father if the~· so elect and signi-
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fy their intention in writing. Additionally, the 
defendant shall have a right to have thE) children 
with him for one week during their Christmas 
school vacation and every other vear sueh visita-
t~on shall include Christmas Day. These specific 
rights of the defendant shall be in addition to de-
fendant's right of reasonable Yisitation with the 
ehildren. ri1 he defendant is to bear the transporta-
tion costs." 
This Finding of the Court was not objected to by 
appellant except that she objected that this specific visi-
tation right should be in addition to other rights of visi-
tation. The court heard the objections and concluded onlY 
that re,spondent should not make unreasonable demands 
upon the appellant for other times of visitation. Appel-
lant did not challenge the Finding below that the fact that 
the children now reside some distance from Salt Lake City 
makes it difficult to exercise his right of visitation and 
appellant does not challenge the Finding that respondent 
shows that he loves his children and desires to give 
them guidance and affection. Even though, as this Court 
said in King vs. King, 25 Ut. 2d 163; 478 Pac. 2d, 492, 
that divorce proceedings are in equity and the Supreme 
Court could review both questions of law and fact, none-
theless, where a Finding is made by the LmveT Court and 
unchallenged, the Court should be most reluctant to dis-
turb that Finding on Appeal. 
The Court is also reminded that the parties agreed 
at the time of the divorce that if the children were re-
moved permanently from the State of Utah, that appellant 
would secure a further agreement with respondent or 
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obtain leave of Court. Appellant did, through her coun-
sel, advise respondent that she was not returning to the 
State of Utah but she did nothing further to honor her 
commitment. She simply ignored the whole situation 
until she was brought to Court on the Petitron of re-
spondent. 
The positi0111 taken by appellant it seems is that since 
she was awarded custody initially it makes no difference 
as to where she chooses to live and what effect this had 
on respondent's right of visitation because the Decree 
was final and cannot be changed. The law is, of course, 
to the contrary. The principle of change is embodied in 
Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annofated, 1953, which states: 
"Disposition of property and children: When a 
decree of divorce is made, the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property 
and parties, and the maintena:nce of the parties 
and children, as may be equitable. The court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subse-
quent changes or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the custo-
dv of the children and their support and mainten-
a~ce, or the distribution of the property as shall 
be reasonable and necessary." 
In a case occurring a number of years ago, our Court 
announced a broad principle relative to the matter of 
split custody. In the case of H olma;n vs. Holman, ..... . 
Ut. ...... , 77 Pac. 2d, 329 (1938) the Court stated: 
"In this case the divorce carried $15 a month 
alimony and support money for the ?hild. He ~s 
fond of the child and craves her soc1et.'·· She is 
15 
now. nearly 6 ye~rs of age, old enough to spend a 
po~10n of her t_1me, whein her schooling ·will not 
be mterfered \v1th, in the society of her father. 
In case a divorce is properly granted and no good 
reason appears for denying the father cnstodv of 
a child for a portion of the year, the decree sh~nld 
provide for a period of such custody, and the 
means of coinveying her to the father if slw is 
living a distance from him." 
In Smith vs. Smith, 9 Ut. 2d 157, 340 Pac. 2d 419, 
our Court had occasion to consider a split custody award. 
The Court did reverse the decision for further proceed-
ings in the Lower Court but indicated that nothing in 
the Record suggests that the children would be treated 
differently by either spouse a:nd pointed out further that 
it was reluctant to upset the Decree in that regard, but 
directed the Lower Court to take a further look at the 
surroundings of the children for the three months in 
question and reminded the Lower Court that the children 
were of tender ye•ars and that such split custody might 
not be so confusing to the children when they were older. 
The Court will note that the children are older. (The 
youngest is 10 years.) 
The Utah case of Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Ut. 2d 73, 
202 Pac. 2d, 550, was a post-divorce proceeding. The 
parties had lived toge.ther in California until the wife 
decided to remarry amd went to Nevada to get a divorce. 
She was awarded cutody of their 3 year old son in the 
divorce proceeding. She then moved to Utah. In Utah 
Courts the father sought partial custody of his son. A 
psychiatrist testified on behalf of the father that it would 
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be to the best interest of the child to be with the father 
for a portion of each year. Another psychiatrist testified 
that it would be to the best interest of the child to remain 
eointinnously in the mother's home. The Trial Court gave 
the father cntody during June, July and August of each 
year. The Supreme Court affirmed the Order upon the 
ground that there was no showing in the Record that the 
Lower Court had committed error in awarding custody 
to the father for June, July, amd August of each year. 
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POINT II. 
THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE MATERIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF APPELLANT WAS A COMPELLING 
REASON FOR REDUCTION OF ALIMONY. 
'!'his Court has often stated (the principle is recog-
nized by appellant in her Brief), that in the event the 
circumstances of the parties change after the divmce, 
the Court has the power to modify the Decree. This 
principle is embodied :Un the Code provision cited above, 
30-3-5, UCA, 1953. Appellant in her Brief has chosen 
to ignore this principle and instead has asked the Court 
to apply the doctrine of Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Ut. 2d 79, 
296 Pac. 2d 977, which case sets forth certairn factors such 
as the duration of the marriage; the age of the parties; 
their social position; health; children; the property they 
have and how it was acquired; their earning capabilities 
and earning potential. 
Appellant argues further that it was contemplated 
at the time of the divorce that appellant would work full 
time as a general practitioner: would reasonably earn 
$32,000.00 a year, and that the sum of alimony awarded 
would be in addition to those earnirngs, and since her 
earnings have not reached that point, alimony should not 
be reduced. 
The position of appellrunt is factually and legally 
untenable. The doctrine of the "\Vilson case has applica-
tion only at the time the divorce is granted. The elements 
set forth in the Wilsorn case have meaning for the Lower 
Court only when the Court initially fixes the amount of 
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stqiport. The correct principle applicable on a modifi-
ration proceeding was announced by our Court in Soren-
son vs. Sorenso11, 20 Ut. 2d 3G4, 438 Pac. 2d 180 (Utah). 
"Our statute permits subsequent changes wh_ich 
are reasonable and proper. This has bee111 con-
strued to empower the Court to make a modifica-
tion where there has been a substantial change in 
the material circumstances of either one or both of 
the parties since the decree was entered." 
The Lower Court in this case correctly applied the 
p6ncipal by thoroughly scrutinizing the Petition of re-
spondent for modification and quantitatively analyzing 
the snhstantial changes in the material circumstances of 
appellant. The Court below sets for,th these chainges in 
specific Findings of Fact (R. 37-41). 
Citing the case of Allen v. Allen, 25 Ut. 2d 87, 475 
Pae. 2d 1021, appellant states that the parties contem-
platPd she would have a substantial income as a general 
practitioner of medicine at the time of the divorce, and, 
thcwpfore, the fact that her income has drarnafa~.ally 
increased is no ground for a reduction of alimony because 
tlrn money she now earns is not as much as she would 
<'arn as a general 11ractitioner. The Record does not 
snpport appellant's factual analysis. There is no evi-
dence slmwing that appellant was a general practitioner. 
A ppe11ant has never maintarned an office or treated 
1mtiPnts. Tlwn• is no evidence that appellant was a mPm-
lwr of the hospital staff. These are some of the indicia of 
thP gc>nPral practice of mPdicine and they are absent in 
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this case. Reference is made to Page 90 of the Record 
starting at Line 7: 
Q. Did you have a speciRlty in 1968 when this 
divorce decree was entered 1 
A. I had had no formal residerncY - specialh 
training, no. · · 
Q. Would you be classified as a general praC'ti-
tioner, at that time, then? 
A. I would simply be classified as a Doctor of 
Medicine, I believe. 
The fact is that appellant during the marriage had 
never worked other tham part-time and the work that she 
had during the marriage was always in the field of Public 
Health. It is also abundantly clear from the Re0ord that 
appellant at the time of the divorce did not contemplate 
that she would work full time. In the Divorce Complaint 
filed by appellant (R-2) she states: 
"The condition of plairntiff's he·alth is now and for 
many months past has been sueh that she requires 
intensive and expensive medical care." 
She used this strategem to obtain alimony at the time 
of the divorce. The intensive amd expensive medical care 
to which she refers is psychiatric care which in the year 
1967 amounted to approximatel)r $4,000.00. Under these 
circumstances it is not possible that the parties contem-
plated that appellant would work part-time. The only 
inference from the Reeord is that appellant would co111-
tinue to have intensive and expensive medical care and 
that her health "-ould not permit her to work. Interesting-
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l~·, at the hearing on the Modification Petition appellant 
testified that at about the time the divorce was granted, 
or shortly thereafter, she discontinued the psychotherapy 
and has not had such treatment since that time. (R-101). 
:B~inally, the testimony of appellant at the modifica-
tion hearing shows that there was no understanding as 
to how much time appellant would devote to work at the 
time of the divorce. 
Q. Dr. Ring, at the time the divorce decree was 
entered, you didn't then have any intention 
of pursuing full-time work, did you·? 
A. I certainly had the intention of pursuing 
work. I knew I must. I was not sure, exactly 
whether it would be full-time or near full-
time ; I really had no - my mind was not 
made up. 
WP ref er now to the Findings of the Lower Court 
(R. 37) and the transcript where the substallltial changes 
in the material circumstances of appellant are set forth. 
rrhe gross income of appellant in 1967, (the year just 
prior to the divorce) '.Vas $6,996.00. This was for part-
tinw work with the Utah State Department of Health. 
Prior to that year appellant had only practiced part-time 
and ahrn~·s in the field of Public Health. Subsequent to 
the divor<'e, appellant complete-cl a medical speciality 
in tlw field of Public Health and now earns $25,620.00 
per vPar as a Public Health Administrator with the 
F'Pde.ral Government and expects periodic increases in 
pa~v in the future. 
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Appellant received the family home in Salt Lake 
City as part of the Divorce Decree. This represented the 
only substantial asset of the parties. She still owned the 
home at the time of this proceeding and received net 
$100.00 per month rental. (R.104). 
AdditiOlllally, appellant has received an inheritance 
of over $30,000.00 since the Divorce Decree was entered. 
(R. 103). 
Her circumstances have materially changed in regard 
to certain expense·s that she no longer has. At the time 
of the divo·rce the children were enrolled in a private 
school in Salt Lake City, Utah, at an expense of appmxi-
mately $3,000.00 per year. The children are no longer 
enrolled in private schools but are enrolled in the1 public 
schools of California so this expense has been eliminated. 
(R.158) 
At the time of the divorce, appellam.t was spending 
approximately $4,000.00 per year for psychiatric counsel-
ing and this expense has been eliminated. (R. 101). 
When all of the above factors are considered as they 
were by the Lower Court, it becomes abundantly clear 
that in this case there is no further legal justification for 
the alimony award. 
If more were needed, the admission of the plaintiff 
as to her needs amply corroborates the conclusion: 
Q. Now, as far as yon personally are concerned, 
vou are able to support yourself, ad0quat0l~·, 
~re vou not, on your salary? 
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A. Yes. (R-107). 
'l'he Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
entered by the Lower Court reduring alimony find ample 
support in Law: 
"The fact that a wife, who was unemployed when 
a de-cree for alimony was entered, has since se-
cured employment, or that her income at the time 
of the decree has increased or decreased substan-
tially, may justify a modification in the decree." 
24 Am. Jr. 2d, Divorce and Separation,, Sec. 680. 
The following Section (681) states: 
"A substantial increase in the wife's separate 
property or estate, as by gift or inheritance, which 
results in an increased income, may justify re-
duction in alimony." 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING THE 
SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN APPELLANT'S INCOME AS 
A FACTOR COMPELLING THE REDUCTION OF ALIMONY. 
The argurnem..t set forth by appellant under hN Point 
III appears to say that regardless of the fact that a wife 
after a divorce, obtains employment or increases her in-
come, cannot be a basis for a reduction in alimony. Im-
plicit in the statements of appellant is the further argu-
ment that 01nce two people have been married and a 
divorce occurs, that the ·wife is forever after entitled to 
extract alimony from the husband regardless of the 
increase in the wife's earnings. The argument is not 
supported by any Utah case and tlw annotation in 18 
ALR 2d, Page 62, as quoted on Page 14 of appellant's 
Brief is not within the context of the entire1 annotation. 
Appropriate, however is a statement from the case anno-
tated, which is Arnold 11s. Arnold, 76 NE 2d 335 (Ill.). 
The Illinois statute is similar to the Utah statute and 
provides: 
""\Vhen a divorce shall ht' decreed, the Court may 
make sucih Order tonching thP alimony and main-
tenance of the wife or hnsband, the care, custody 
amd support of the children, or any of them as, 
from thP circumstance of the parties and the 
nature of thP east', shall be fit, rPasoll'ahle and 
just ... and the Court may, on .appl~ca.tion, from 
timP to time, make sneh alterat10ns rn the allow-
ance of alimonv and maimtenance, and the care, 
custodv and support of thP ehildren, as shall he 
reason'able and proper." 
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The Court then quoted from an earlier Illinois case 
as follows: 
"The foundation of alimony beiing the obligation 
of the husband to support his wife and the decree 
being merely the enforcement of' that obligation 
in behalf of a wife legally permitted to live apart 
from her husband, our statute wisely recognizes 
that a change in circumstances may require a 
change in the decree. As a measure of the sum 
required is necessarily the need of the wife and 
the ability of the husband to pay, the amount 
decreed will logically be ,affected by change m 
eithl'r element." (Emphasis supplied.) 
On Page 59 of ALR 2d, the following is stated: 
"The fact that the wife was 1J1ot employed when the 
decree for alimony or maintenance \\~as entered 
but secured employment later is often an import-
ant consideration in determin:iing whether to re-
duce or terminate the payments." 
The argument of appellant is further refuted by a 
statement in Sorenson vs. Sore%son, 20 Ut. 2d 364, 438 
Pac. 2d 180: 
"Our statute permits subsequent changes which 
are reasonable and proper. This ha:S been con-
strued to empower the Court to make a modifica-
tion where there has been a substantial chamge in 
the material circumstances of either one, or both, 
of the parties since the decree was entered." 
'rhe argument made by appellant that her substantrial 
increase in income was not a factor to be considered by 
the Lower Court, is squarely defeated by the Sorenson 
rase, when the Court states that the Lower Court may 
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modify for substantial change of circumstances of ''either 
one or both of the parties." 
Again there were other factors before the Court for 
consideration which are set forth i:n other parts of this 
Brief. This Court should ref er part,icularly to paragraph 
10 of the Findings of the LoweT Court: 
"The uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiff 
was that her salary was entirely adequate for her 
support without reliance upon the alimony paid 
by defendwnt, and this fact iR 0orroborated by the 
information shown on the Exhibits introdnced w-
lating to plaintiff's financial (~xpendihues." (R. 
39). 
The evidence supports the foregoing Finding of the 
Court and appellant has not by her argument shown any 
financial reason why that Finding should be disturbed. 
Irndeed, it would be difficult for most of us to conclude 
that a financial need exists where a person earns in ex-
cess of $26,000.00 a year. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN MODIFYING THE DECREE EVEN THOUGH BASED UP-
ON STIPULATION. 
The argument made under this Point is that if a 
Divorce Decree is in part based upon a Stipulation of the 
parties, it camnot thereafter be altered unless a showing 
of hardship is made. Appellant cites as suppo,rt for the 
proposition a statement from 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and 
Reparation, Sec. 670. It is an accurate quotation but 
taken out of context and not really germane to the issues 
i1n this case. The attention of the Court is invited to the 
first part of the quoted Section where the correct and 
general rule of law is stated: 
"Although there is some authority to the contrary, 
it is the almost universal rule that where a Court 
has the general power to modify a decree for ali-
mony, such power is not affected by the fact that 
such a decree for alimonv refers to, or is based 
upon or even incorporate~, an agreenwnt ente,red 
into by the parties to the action." 
The sentence quoted by appellant has been taken 
from what appears to be an exception to the ge1J1eral rule 
and is set forth later in the Section. The sentence refers 
to a situation where alimo111y is an integral part of a 
propPrty settlement agreement and not in fact, a pro-
vision for support. We have in mind a situation where 
:-:uh:-:tantial assets of the parties are being divided and 
the 1n·ovision for monthly alimony is a device to equalize 
assets where, as an example, the famil~v business cannot 
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be liquidated. In a situation such as that, the Court 
would not have the power to modify ain alimony provision 
because it would be an integral part of a contract settling 
property rights. That is the type situation that the state-
ment quoted by appellant appliPs. It has no application 
in this case because the Stipulation entered into b~, the 
parties was of the usual variety seen daily in our Courts 
awarding certain property absolutely and providing for 
future support. 
The absolute finality contended for by appellant in 
the award of alimony is 'not supported by the Decree of 
Divorce. Paragraph 8 of the Decree (R. 23) states: 
"Defendant shall pay to plaintiff as alimony thP 
sum of $600.00 per month commencing May l, 19GS 
and until further orde,r of the Court." 
Where, as here, the Lower Court contemplated possi-
ble modification in the very la:nguage of the Decree, ap-
pellant cannot be heard to complain when the Court, 
finding adequate ground for modification, exercises the 
discretion clearly spelled out in the Decree. 
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POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ELIMINATING FROM 
THE DIVORCE DECREE THE PROVISION ALLOWING RE-
SPONDENT TO CLAIM THE THREE CHILDREN AS IN-
COME TAX EXEMPTIONS. 
The Divorce Decree (R. 23) provided iin part: 
" ... provided that the defendant 'may claim the 
children as exemptions on his State and Federal 
income tax so long as payments are not delin-
quent." 
After the Petition of respondent was heard by the 
Lower Court and after the Court made and entered writ-
ten Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together 
with an appropriate Order, the appellant on Jun.e 7, 1972, 
filed with the Court a pleading entitled Objections to 
Findings, Conclusions and Order. (R. 47-48). Contained 
in the Objection is a statement by appellant that if the 
Modification Order was to remain, then the provision 
relating to income tax exemptions should be eliminated. 
Without hearing any evidence concerniing the pro-
priety of such an Order and merely upon the argument 
of counsel, the Lower Court modified the Divorce Decree 
by eliminating therefrom the provision allowing respond-
t'nt to claim the Federal and State income tax exemption 
This Court will recall that at the time of the hearing 
on modification, the Lower Court expressed concern 
about the amount being paid by respondent as child 
support. Respondent voluntarily accepted the increase 
sngg0sted and ordered by the Lower Court to $125.00 
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per month per child, or a total of $375.00 per month child 
support mo1ney. It was not until later when the Objections 
to the Frndings were filed by respondent, that the Comt 
eliminated the income tax feature. Had appellant raised 
this issue at the time evidence was taken by the Lower 
Court, respondent would have had an opportunity to pre-
sent evidence showing the necessity that the income tax 
feature of the Divorce Decree remain unchanged. At 
the hearing thereon no evidence was taken. The argu-
ment made by appellamt for the elimination of the tax 
feature of the Decree was that if thE> alimon~· was to be 
reduced, then the question of who would get the exemp-
tions should be left open. (R. 47-48). 
Appellant further argued that the tax feature of the 
Decree of Divorce was predicated on rt>spondent provid-
ing a certain level of family support. Reference to the 
Divorce Decree entered b~· the Court (R. 22 through 24) 
contains no implication that the tax feature of the Stipu-
lation is subject to respondent paying at a certain income 
level. It merely co1I1tains the usual provision that re-
spondent could claim the tax exemption so long as he was 
not delinquent in payments. 
rrhere is simply no evidentiary basis for the Court's 
ruling and the Record before this Court crunnot support it. 
It is true that in matters of divorce the Trial Court 
possessPs broad equitable powers to solve family prob· 
lems but the exercise of thesP powers is dependent upon 
a fadual record so that this Court will know whether the 
decision of the LowN· Conrt was sonnd and in kerping 
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with the needs of the parties. On the Record before this 
Court on the issue it is impossible to tell why the Court 
rnled as it did and whether sound discretion was exer-
eised. For this reason alone the Lower Court should be 
reversed on this Point. A further reason is the fact that 
support money was increased from $200.00 a month to 
$375.00 a mointh and the only inference to be drawn there-
from is that respondent is even more entitled to claim 
the exemption. 
There are practical considerations involved also. Sec. 
152 ( e) of the United States Internal Revenue Code now 
provides in substance that a parent not having custody 
of a child may claim the exemption under the following 
circumstances : 
1. If the parent pays at least $600.00 per year 
for the support of the child and the Divorce 
Decree or a written Agreement says that the 
parent is entitled to the exemption, the Reve-
nue Service will accept the claim even though 
the contribution wasn't more than half of the 
child's support. 
2. If the parent provides more than $1,200.00 
for the support of the child, then he or she is 
entitled to the exemption unless the parent 
having custody provided a larger amoun~ for 
support. In this case each parent is entitled 
to an itemized accounting of expenditnres. 
One of the functions of the Divorce Court is to reduce 
eonflicts hetween embattled spouses. If the Order of the 
Lower Court is to remain under this Point, it is easy 
to forPsPe a eontinuing argum0nt between these two par-
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ties. It will result in an annual accounting· contest. That 
is not desirable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the Lower Court modifying the Divorce 
Decree in regard to the expanded visitation privileges 
of respondeint and the reduction of alimony should be 
affirmed. The Order of the Court eliminating respond-
ent's right to claim the Federal and State income tax 
exemption should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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